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Abstract. Preference aggregation as a problem of a single consensus ranking determination, using 
Kemeny rule, for m rankings, including ties, of n alternatives is considered in the paper. The 
Kemeny Ranking Problem (KRP) may have considerably more than one optimal solutions (strict 
orders or permutations of the alternatives) and, hence, special efforts to deal with this phenomenon 
are needed. In the paper, there is proposed an efficient formal rule for convolution of the N multiple 
optimal permutations, the output profile B(N, n), into an exact single final consensus ranking, 
which can include ties. The convolution rule is as follows: in the final consensus ranking, 
alternatives are arranged in ascending order of their rank sums (total ranks) calculated for the 
output profile B; some two alternatives are considered to be tolerant if they have the same rank 
sums in B. The equivalent convolution rule can be also applied as follows: in the final consensus 
ranking, alternatives are arranged in descending order of row sums (total scores) calculated for a 
tournament table built for B; some two alternatives are deemed to be tolerant if they have the same 
row sums. It is shown that, for any alternative, its total rank and total score are equal in sum to the 
output profile dimension N´n. The convolution rules are validated using Borda count. 
1. Introduction 
In this paper we consider a preference aggregation procedure in the form of Kemeny rule. Being 
essentially the multiple heterogeneous properties measurement in an ordinal scale, preference aggregation 
belongs to a circle of problems relevant to measurement science [1]. Additionally, in the recent few years, 
the preference aggregation and the processing of ranked data have attracted considerable interest within a 
much broader consideration covered by such a rapidly developing area of artificial intelligence as machine 
learning [2]. Appropriate methods are used to solve newly emerging problems, such as crowd 
sensing/labeling, sentiment analysis, meta-search engines, interval data fusion and others [2–7]. 
The preference aggregation is a single consensus ranking determination for m rankings (voters), 
possibly including ties, of n alternatives (candidates). This is a classical problem that has been intensively 
investigated firstly as a Voting Problem in the framework of Social Choice Theory [8]. 
Let we have a set A = {a1, a2, ..., an} of n alternatives and a set L = {l1, l2, ..., lm} of rankings defined 
over the set A, where each of m rankings (also called preference relation or weak order) has a form of 
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chain of size n, e.g. l = a2 f a1 f... f as ~ at f... f ap ~ aq, and may include f, a strict preference relation 
r, and ~, a tolerance relation (or tie) t, so that l = rÈt. The set L(m, n) is called a preference profile for 
the given m rankings of n alternatives. 
We will use the following obvious short notation for a ranking:  
 lk = a2 f a1 f... f as ~ at f... f ap ~ aq Û 21…(st)…(pq).                                 (1) 
For example, a2 f a5 ~ a1 f a3 ~ a4  f a6 Û 2(51)(34)6 or a3 f a1 f a5f a2 f a6 f a4 Û 315264. 
Let Pn be a set of all n! strict order relations f on A; each strict order r Î Pn is in one-to-one 
correspondence with a permutation of first n natural numbers ¥n = {1, 2, …, n}; in this sense, we will treat 
notions of strict (or linear) order and permutation as synonyms. 
Preference aggregation goal is to determine a consensus ranking b that is a single preference relation 
that would give an integrative characterization of the profile L(m, n).  
There are many rules to find the consensus ranking [9]. We use the Kemeny rule [10] consisting in 
determination of such linear order (Kemeny ranking) b Î Pn of the alternatives of A that the distance D(β, 
L) (defined in terms of the number of pairwise inconsistencies between rankings) from b to the rankings 
of the initial profile L(m, n)  is minimal for all possible strict orders r (permutations), that is  
 argmin iji j p<b = å ,                                        (2) 
where 
1
[1 sgn( , )], , 1,..., ,
m k k
ij i jk
p a a i j n
=
= - =å  is an element of the (n´n) profile matrix [pij] = Р, rows 
and columns of which are labeled by the alternatives' numbers (indexes); 
1,
sgn( , ) 0, ~
1,
i j
i j i j
i j
a a






 is a 
function that reveals the sign (or direction) of the pair (ai, aj)Îl. 
The Kemeny rule (2) is an optimization problem, called the Kemeny Ranking Problem (KRP), which 
means the determination of such a transposition of the profile matrix rows and columns that the sum of 
elements of its upper triangle submatrix, i.e. ( , ) iji jD p<r L = å , is minimal.  
Clearly since the set Pn is finite, the Kemeny ranking always exists, however it is not always unique as 
the optimal distance value may correspond to not the only transposition of the profile matrix rows and 
columns, that is
1 2
1 2( , ) ( , ) ... ( , )
N
ij ij N iji j i j i j
D p D p D p
< < <
b L = = b L = = = b L =å å å , where N is 
a number of Kemeny rankings (optimal permutations) [2,3,11,12]. Furthermore, it was shown in [1] that in 
certain situations the number of multiple optimal permutations may exceed 107 even for small m = 4 and n 
= 15 and also the solutions may rank the alternatives in significantly different ways what produces much 
more ambiguity than that inherent in the initial profile L.  
Example 1. Let the following profile be given: L(3,3) = {1~32; 31~2; 2~31}. Then the KRP has two 
solutions: b1 = 312 and b2 = 321, both having minimal distance to the profile D(b1, L) = D(b2, L) = 5. The 
considered profile L(3,3) is shown in figure 1 as belonging to the weak order space for n = 3. !   
In order to solve the KRP we use the recursive algorithm of our own design, RECURSALL, 
implementing the branch & bound technique, allowing to find all possible Kemeny rankings for a given 
preference profile [4]. It is convenient to term the initial preference profile L(m, n) as input profile and the 
multiple optimal permutations as output profile B(N, n) = {b1, b2, ..., bN}, B Ì Pn (see figure 2). 
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Clear that special efforts to deal with the phenomenon of the KRP multiple optimal solutions, where Ns 
>> m, are needed. The rest of the paper is devoted to development of an efficient formal rule for 




Figure 2. Stages of the final consensus ranking determination. 
2. Convolution rule for the KRP multiple solutions 
A rule for convolution of the set of optimal permutations can be formulated as follows. Let B(N, n) = {b1, 
b2, …, bN}, B Ì Pn, be an output profile of the KRP applied to an input profile L(m, n) = {l1, l2, ..., lm} 
given over some set of alternatives A = {a1, a2, ..., an} and rank 
k
ir  be a position of an alternative ai in the 






= å . 
Then, for all i < j, i, j = 1, …, n,  
ri < rj Þ ai f aj and ri = rj Þ ai ~ aj,                                                    (3) 
where both relations f and ~ are in the single final consensus ranking bfin. 
Thus, the final consensus ranking may include tolerances as well as an arbitrary lk Î L, i.e. generally 
speaking, bfin = rÈt and bfin Ï Pn. 
Example 2. Table 1 and figure 3 show an example of convoluting two optimal permutations into a single 




























 i,j 3 1 2 
 3 0 1 1 
P(b1) =  1 5 0 3 
 2 5 3 0 
 
 
i,j 3 2 1 
 3 0 1 1 
P(b2) = 2 5 0 3 
 1 5 3 0 
 
 














Weak order space, n = 3 
Preference profile  
{l1, l2, l3} and consensus rankings b1 and b2 
Elements of distances  
D(b1, L) = 5 and D(b2, L) = 5 
Figure 1. Toward s multiplicity of the KRP solutions: preference profile {l1, l2, l3} and consensus  
rankings b1 and b2 in the weak order space for n = 3. 
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however, their distances to the initial profile are D(b1, L) = D(b2, L) = 58. The convolution rule (3) allows 
to find their true positions in bfin, namely as in the ranking 421(35)6. !  
 
Table 1. Example of the convolution rule (3) application. 
Input profile L Output profile B Ranks of alternatives in B Final solution bfin 
l1: 1 2  6 4(3 5) 
l2: 4 5 1 2 3 6 
l3: 2(51)(34)6 
l4: (63)4 2(15) 
l5: 3 4 (26) 51                         
b1:  4  2  1  3  6  5 
b2:  4  2  5  1  3  6 
 a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6 
1
ir  3 2 4 1 6 5 
2
ir  4 2 5 1 3 6 
1 2
i ir r+  7 4 9 2 9 11 
 
Short form: 
4 2 1 (35) 6 
Extended form: 
a4 f a2 f a1 f a3 ~ a5 f a6                         
 
The convolution rule (3) guarantees determination of an exact single optimal permutation bfin for any 
output profile B. 
 
 
3. Convolution rule justification 
Let the output profile B(N, n) be represented by the (n´n) tournament table S = [sij], where
1
( , ), , 1,...,
N k k
ij i jk
s a a i j nr=
= =å I , is the matrix element and 
1 if  ( , )
( , )









I  is the indicator 
function1. 







= å . Then multiple permutations can be also convoluted using the scores zi as follows: for 
all i < j, i, j = 1, …, n,  
zi > zj Þ ai f aj and zi = zj Þ ai ~ aj,                                                   (4) 
where both relations f and ~ are in the single final consensus ranking bfin. 
The convolution rule (4) guarantees determination of an exact single optimal permutation bfin for any 
output profile B, and the single optimal permutation is the same as that found using the rule (3). In fact, 
the rule (4) coincides with the preference aggregation rule well known as Borda count [13]. 
                                                          
1 For the indicator function, the following statements are hold: (ai, aj) Î r Û ai f aj and (ai, aj) Ï r Û ai p aj. 
Initial profile matrix P The profile matrix re-arranged 
by consensus ranking b
1
 
Figure 3. Profile matrices from Example 2. 




 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 0 6 4 6 6 4 
2 4 0 4 6 2 3 
3 6 6 0 5 5 3 
4 4 4 5 0 2 4 
5 4 8 5 8 0 6 
6 6 7 7 6 4 0 
 4 2 1 3 6 5 
4 0 4 4 5 4 2 
2 6 0 4 4 3 2 
1 5 6 0 4 4 6 
3 5 6 6 0 3 5 
6 6 7 6 7 0 4 
5 8 8 4 5 6 0 
 4 2 5 1 3 6 
4 0 4 2 4 5 4 
2 6 0 2 4 4 3 
5 8 8 0 4 5 6 
1 6 6 6 0 4 4 
3 5 6 5 6 0 3 
6 6 7 4 6 7 0 
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For any output profile B(N, n) represented by a corresponding tournament table [sij], the following 
equation is valid: 
, 1,...,i ir N n z i n= × - = .                                                             (5) 
Example 3. Table 2 shows the values of scores and rank sums calculated for the profile alternatives from 
Example 2. The alternatives are sorted in accordance with rules (3) and (4). It can be seen the fairness of 
expression (5) for these data.     
Table 2. Scores and rank sums of the output profile В from Example 2. 
Alternatives a4 a2 a1 a3 a5 a6 
Total score zi 10 8 5 3 3 1 
Total rank  ri 2 4 7 9 9 11 
N×n =  zi + ri 12 12 12 12 12 12 
 
The expression (5) can serve as a basis for justification of the convolution rule (3) validity. Indeed, let 
a social score function f assigns a nonempty choice set C Ì A to a profile B. It was proved by H.P. Young 
in [13] that “for any fixed number n of alternatives, there is one and only one social score function that is 
neutral, consistent, faithful, and has cancellation property – namely, Borda’s rule”. The properties of the 
function f listed in the Young’s statement are deemed as the set of axioms necessary and sufficient in 
order to have a fully characterized preference aggregation rule [14]. Thus, the scores zi, implementing 
Borda rule, guarantee that the rule (4) leads to convolution of the output profile В(N, n) into the exact and 
single consensus ranking bfin. It follows from (5) that social score functions f coincide for the rules (3) and 
(4).   
4. Conclusion 
It was shown in the paper that the multiple optimal permutations, i.e. the output profile B(N, n)  = {b1, b2, 
..., bN}, as solutions of the KRP for m rankings, including ties, of n alternatives can be efficiently 
transformed into an exact single final consensus ranking bfin, which can also include ties. The proposed 
convolution rule is as follows: in the final consensus ranking bfin, alternatives are arranged in ascending 
order of their rank sums calculated for the output profile B; in bfin some two alternatives are tolerant to 
each other if they have the same rank sums in the output profile. The equivalent convolution rule can be 
also applied as follows: in the final consensus ranking bfin, alternatives are arranged in descending order of 
row sums (total scores) zi calculated for a tournament table S of the output profile B; in bfin some two 
alternatives are tolerant to each other if they have the same row sums of the tournament table.  
It was also shown that, for any i-th alternative, its total rank ri and total score zi are equal in sum to a 
constant value N×n, that is the dimension of the output profile B. The convolution rules validity has been 
shown using such well known preference aggregation rule as Borda count. 
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